Capital liberalization and the US external imbalance by Prades, Elvira & Rabitsch, Katrin
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Elvira Prades and Katrin Rabitsch
Capital liberalization and the US external imbalance
Article (Accepted for Publication)
(Refereed)
Original Citation:
Prades, Elvira and Rabitsch, Katrin (2012) Capital liberalization and the US external imbalance.
Journal of International Economics, 87 (1). pp. 36-49. ISSN 0022-1996
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/3722/
Available in ePubWU: December 2012
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
This document is the version accepted for publication and — in case of peer review — incorporates
referee comments. There are minor differences between this and the publisher version which could
however affect a citation.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
Capital liberalization and the US external imbalance
Elvira Pradesy Katrin Rabitsch z
December 1, 2011
Abstract
Dierences in nancial systems are often named as a prime candidate for the current
state of global imbalances. This paper focuses on cross-country heterogeneity in access
to international nancial markets that derives from the presence of capital controls and
argues that the process of capital liberalization over the past decades can explain a sub-
stantial fraction of US net external liabilities. We present a simple two-country model
with an internationally traded bond, in which capital controls are reected in the pres-
ence of borrowing and lending constraints on that bond. In a US versus the rest of the
world (RoW) scenario, we perform experiments that are largely consistent with countries'
liberalization experiences. A reduction in the RoW's controls on capital outows and/or
a tightening in the RoW's borrowing constraint enables the US economy to better insure
against consumption risk relative to the rest of the world, and therefore decreases its
motives for precautionary asset holdings relative to the rest of the world. As a result of
these asymmetric shifts in countries' barriers to capital mobility, the US runs a long run
external decit.
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1 Introduction
In recent years the US net external liabilities stand at close to 20% of its GDP, the current
account has been in decit for most of the last 25 years. The fact that the US is an ex-
ternal borrower, and the size and persistence of its net external position is challenging to
the conventional wisdom of standard economic theory and has led to a large debate on the
sustainability of these imbalances, whether and when adjustment needs to take place or how
painful it is going to be for the world economy. A number of authors have argued that major
policy actions need to be taken to avoid a painful worldwide rebalancing process (e.g. Ob-
stfeld and Rogo (2004), Roubini and Setser (2005), Blanchard et al. (2005)). On the other
hand, a number of papers have emphasized that before policy advice can be given as to how
adjustment of the current global imbalance should take place, it is important to understand
how these imbalances have arrived in the rst place.
We suggest that part of the US imbalance can be rationalized by noting that countries
dier in their degree of openness to international nancial markets and dier in their lib-
eralization experiences over recent decades. Arguably, the US is the economy that has had
the most liberalized capital account already in the 1980s while in most other regions of the
world capital controls were much more prevalent. In the rest of the world the process of
capital liberalization has, over the last decades, led on the one hand to a reduction of controls
on capital outows, as a result of the catching up of other advanced and emerging market
economies in terms of capital account openness. On the other hand, many emerging market
economies that have experienced crises after an initial liberalization of their capital accounts,
have subsequently faced increased limitations in their ability to borrow internationally. We
argue that, over these two developments, capital liberalization has led to asymmetric changes
in countries' ability to borrow and lend internationally, which has brought about dierences
in their ability to manage consumption uncertainty. In particular, it has improved, relative to
the rest of the world (RoW), the US's ability to make better use of international nancial mar-
kets to smooth their consumption and therefore has lowered their motives for precautionary
asset holdings relative to RoW. As a result, the US runs an external decit.
We address this question in a stylized two-country one good model of consumption and
saving choice. We consider an endowment economy, where outputs arrive stochastically each
period. The home economy is taken to be the US while the foreign economy stands for the
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rest of the world. We assume that there is a representative agent in each country that can
trade a non-contingent bond to smooth consumption in response to country specic shocks,
but that she cannot do so unrestrictedly. In particular, in each country the agent has limited
access to borrow and lend in international nancial markets; there are limits beyond which
capital cannot ow in or out. We think of the presence of capital controls as being reected in
the tightness of these borrowing and lending constraints. When the limits are set to zero, such
that the bond holdings are not only constrained but cannot be used at all, the economies are
in nancial autarky. As the constraints get more and more relaxed, it becomes increasingly
easier to smooth consumption.
The setup of the model provides us with a novel framework in which to study the implica-
tions of capital controls for the international macroeconomy. We use this model framework to
analyze the eect of changes in countries' degree of nancial openness that have resulted from
the process of capital liberalization. In particular, we use the model to perform two experi-
ments: The catching up of the RoW's nancial openness is modeled as a one-time permanent
relaxation of the upper limit of capital outows of the foreign economy. On the other hand,
the limitations that some emerging market countries faced in their ability to borrow interna-
tionally in response to crisis experiences is modeled as a tightening in the RoW's borrowing
constraint. Eectively, both these channels improve the US ability to borrow in international
nancial markets relative to the rest of the world. For any given level of risk it faces it can
now better use the international bond to achieve smooth consumption, and the implied drop
in consumption volatility means that it has less of a motive to hold assets as a buer for
times of low consumption. It is this drop in the (relative) importance of the precautionary
savings motive that endogenously makes the US hold long run negative net foreign assets as
it transitions to a new implied steady state.
We conduct extensive sensitivity analysis for crucial parameters, most importantly for the
initial level of nancial openness and the extent of liberalization assumed. We also consider a
model with production and capital accumulation, thereby allowing for an additional (internal)
asset that the change in precautionary asset demand can fall on. The model allowing for
capital accumulation is essentially the framework of Backus et al. (1992), which is a standard
workhorse model of international macroeconomics. In all specications, we show, that our
model framework implies that dierences in nancial openness and the process of capital
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liberalization can contribute to rationalizing the sizeable observed imbalances and can help
explain the puzzle of the direction of net ows, within a standard neoclassical model.
There are several contributions in the recent literature that our paper connects to, which
also stress the importance of dierences in precautionary motives of the US and other countries
as a potential driving force behind the imbalances. It is important to note, however, that the
source of these precautionary motives is dierent.
Mendoza et al. (2009, hereafter MQRR), and previously Willen (2004), emphasize the
heterogeneity in the level of development of countries' local nancial systems, such as the
domestic credit market and dierences in the ability to borrow from collateral.1 In their model
agents face idiosyncratic risk from both endowments and investment technologies, which has to
be managed dierently. In this relatively rich model setup, dierences in nancial development
between countries matter when economies open up to trade in international nancial markets.
The accompanied process of factor equalization { less developed economies face an increase
in the interest rate relative to its autarky interest rate, therefore an incentive to save { leads
to capital ows from less developed nancial markets into the US economy.
While both our contribution and MQRR emphasize cross-country heterogeneity in nan-
cial factors, the type of heterogeneity and the mechanism generating imbalances are dierent.
Contrary to MQRR the dierent strength of precautionary assets derives not from dierences
in the level of development of domestic nancial markets; in our model the representative
agent assumption implies that nancial markets within each of the two countries are complete.
The dierences in precautionary asset holdings arrive solely from the fact that the nancial
globalization experience was heterogenous across countries:2 while the US was unrestricted,
both in borrowing from abroad or in investing abroad, the process of capital liberalization has
removed barriers to capital mobility in the RoW, largely lifting restrictions that prevented
the RoW from investing abroad. At the same time, because of market reactions to the liber-
alization experiences of emerging economies may not have seen an equivalent change in how
easily the RoW can borrow in international nancial markets. Another important distinction
1Caballero et al. (2006) also relate the US imbalance to heterogenous domestic nancial systems, but their
proposed channel is of rather dierent nature, focusing on an asset supply channel: they argue that, in emerging
market economies, the development of local nancial markets has not kept pace with the growth experiences of
their economies which has resulted in an inability to supply the high quality nancial assets savers may seek.
2which, in turn, is assumed to have been the same for all countries in MQRR: they consider a scenario in
which all countries were initially equally constrained (nancial autarky) and simultaneously all capital controls
were fully removed (full integration).
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with respect to MQRR is that also the type of risk that matters for the respective nan-
cial market heterogeneity diers; while it is idiosyncratic risk that matters for the nancial
market heterogeneity MQRR emphasize, the model in our paper focuses on country specic,
aggregate risk.
Another mechanism that rationalizes part of the observed US imbalance as an equilibrium
outcome of dierences in precautionary savings across countries is suggested by Fogli and
Perri (2006). They emphasize that the 'great moderation' in business cycle volatility has
been disproportionably strongly experienced by the US (compared to the rest of the world),
which has led to a decline not only in absolute, but also in relative consumption volatility.
While the mechanism of our paper is similar in that the US imbalance also derives from a
lower relative consumption volatility, this is a result of the opening up of countries' capital
accounts which allows the US to make disproportionably better use of international nancial
markets.
Durdu et al. (2009) use a small open economy model to suggest that the motive for
emerging market economies' precautionary asset holdings may stem from either changes in
business cycle volatility, from nancial globalization, or from self-insurance against sudden
stops. In the line of thought of a self-insurance motive, we obtain similar eects from our
experiment of modeling the increased diculty to borrow internationally.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how nancial openness
and capital liberalization is measured in the data. In section 3 we present the model frame-
work, a simple two-country endowment model that allows for constraints on capital in- and
outows. Subsection 3.2 explains in detail how nancial openness and capital liberalization
is modeled. Subsection 3.3 discusses parametrization. In section 4 we present the results of
our 'capital liberalization' exercise for the simple model together with extensive sensitivity
analysis, while section 5 discusses results for the model with capital accumulation. Section 6
concludes.
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2 Empirical Motivation
2.1 The US External Position
Figure 1 plots the development of the US current account and its net foreign asset (NFA)
position. At the end of 2007 they stand, respectively, at -5.2% and -15.2% of GDP. As can
be seen the gradual decline in the US net external position begins in the mid 1980s, and was
actually positive before. As we will show in the next section, the beginning of this downward
trend in the US NFA position coincides with major liberalization periods in terms capital
account openness in the rest of the world.
Figure 1: US current account and net foreign assets as percentage of GDP
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2008 is based on preliminary data.
2.2 Measurement of Financial Openness and Capital Liberalization
A large literature has studied the eect of nancial integration on growth and volatility, with
mixed conclusions. While the focus of this paper is a dierent one { in particular, we focus on
the eect of nancial integration on countries' net foreign asset positions {, we draw from this
literature in terms of how it treats the measurement of nancial openness. In general, one
can distinguish two types of measures of nancial openness, de jure and de facto measures.
The majority of papers studying the eects of capital account liberalization rely on 'de
jure' measures, which reect legal restrictions on capital movements (or lack thereof). These
are rule-based indices on various types of capital controls, in the largest number of cases based
on the IMF's Annual Reports on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
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(AREAER).3 A shortcoming of de jure measures is the fact that they just capture whether
there are controls or not, but not how stringent these controls are. In addition to the problem
of measuring the intensity of legal capital controls, there is generally also a lack of systematic
information on how strongly these legal restrictions are enforced.
De facto measures of nancial integration typically look at actual data on cross-country
capital ows (or interest rate dierentials) to draw conclusions about the degree of capital
mobility. Observed ows do, however, not necessarily capture the correct degree of capital
mobility. In practice it is dicult to distinguish whether capital does not ow across countries
because of actual restrictions or because of other factors unrelated to the level of capital
restrictions.
Figure 2 documents the evolution of three types of de jure indices for the United States,
for the group of industrial countries other than the US, and for emerging economies, over
the period of 1983-2004.4 We focus on de jure indices since these most closely reect the
prevailing level and evolution of restrictions on capital ows, that we will be interested in
for our theoretical model. The line with diamond-signs displays the evolution of a country-
average over a binary indicator on 'restrictions on payments for capital account transactions'
published in the pre-1996 editions of the IMF's AREAER, which takes on value 1 if there are
restrictions or value 0 if there are no restrictions. As noted by Eichengreen (2001) this simple
dummy accounts only for controls on capital outows. Because of the obvious limitations of
a dichotomic dummy the IMF changed reporting procedures starting with the 1996 edition of
the AREAER. In the category of restrictions on payments for capital account transactions,
the 'new' AREAER provides dummies in not one but 13 subcategories of transactions, some
of which are even further disaggregated. Miniane (2004) uses the post-1996 disaggregated
capital account information and extends the indices back to 1983 for a representative sample of
countries. This index is given by the line with circle-signs in gure 2. While the disaggregated
indices generally do a better job than the pre-1996 single dummy in reecting global trends
3Among others, de-jure measures based on information on the AREAER have been developed by Quinn
(1997), Johnston and Tamirisa (1998), Miniane (2004), Glick and Hutchison (2005) and Chinn and Ito (2005).
There are also a number of surveys of the literature, see e.g Dooley (1996), Eichengreen (2001) and Edison
et al. (2002).
4The group of industrial countries except US consists of Canada, Japan, Austria, Australia, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain and
the UK. The group of emerging countries consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru,
Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela.
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toward capital account liberalization, the index unfortunately does not distinguish between
controls on capital inows and outows.5 Finally, the third line presented in gure 2 plots the
inverse of an index of nancial openness developed by Chinn and Ito (2005), which is given
by the line with crosses.6 Chinn and Ito's index is a broader measure in the sense that it
incorporates information not only on countries' restrictions on capital account transactions,
but also on restrictions on current account transactions, the presence of multiple exchange
rates within that country or requirements for the surrender of export proceeds.
As can be seen from these indices, the US has always been nancially open over the last
three decades, and most other regions have been liberalizing gradually since the beginning of
the 1980s. The IMF dummy indicates that the US were not imposing any restrictions on its
capital outows over the entire period. The Chinn and Ito index also appraises the US the
highest nancial openness over the entire period. Only Miniane's index indicates that the US
has also been liberalizing its capital account, however, starting from a low level of restrictions
already in the mid 1980s.
Figure 2: Indices of Capital Restrictions
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The indices for the group of industrial countries other that the US also paint a clear
picture. Initially, in the mid 1980s, because of controls on capital inows and especially on
5While the 'new' AREAER editions after 1996 now makes a distinction between capital inows and capital
outows, this information is not available for earlier periods.
6As the original index is an index of openness we plot the inverse of it (and rescale the index to the 0 to 1
interval) to make it comparable with the other measures of capital restrictions.
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outows in many industrial countries world capital markets were far from complete. With
the end of the Bretton Woods system and the move towards exible exchange rate regimes,
the national monetary authorities of most advanced countries were increasingly freed from
balance of payment constraints, which thus permitted them to relax capital controls.7 While
for many countries capital was not being prevented from owing into the country, controls
on capital outows often were much tighter. Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) provide evidence
that, for countries at an early liberalization stage, capital outow controls are more prevalent
than controls on inows on most types of transactions. Similar ndings can be reached from
the literature that measures capital mobility from data on interest rate dierentials, which
will be reviewed below. The evolution of the IMF dummy indicates that starting in the mid
1980s controls on capital outows for the group of industrial countries other than the US have
been largely eliminated. Also the other indices suggest that industrial countries have largely
caught up with the US in terms of capital account openness.
For the group of emerging countries the picture is somewhat less clear. One thing to point
out is the general higher level of restrictions on capital ows to begin with, when compared
to industrial countries. On the other hand, the removal of restriction seems to have occurred
also at a lower pace. Nevertheless, liberalization of capital accounts did take place to some
degree, often as a result of pressure from the industrialized world. For the IMF index we
observe, after an initial spike, a steady reduction of restrictions on capital outows. The
Miniane index displays a lesser degree of liberalization. This may be partly due to the fact
that after recurrent crisis that some of the emerging market economies have faced during the
end of the 1990s, they suered limitations in their ability to borrow internationally.
Because of the obvious diculties in interpreting the intensity of capital controls from
the de jure measures above, and their lack of distinction between capital inow and capital
outow controls, it is useful to take a tour into another stream of the literature that can say
something more in this direction: the literature that interprets onshore-oshore interest rate
dierentials and deviations from covered interest parity as resulting from capital controls.8
7As Obstfeld and Taylor (1998) argue, in an open economy countries face a 'macroeconomic trilemma', in
the sense that they cannot simultaneously target the exchange rate, use monetary policy in pursuit of other
domestic objectives, and have free capital mobility.
8A drawback of this approach is that interest dierentials tend to be available only for a limited number of
countries and years { specically, for countries that are important enough to have well-developed oshore mar-
kets and advanced enough nancially to have well-developed forward currency markets. Also, the measurement
of interest rate dierentials is typically conned to a consideration of short-term assets only.
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The presence of capital controls generally drives a wedge between these interest rates, resulting
in large deviations from covered interest parity, and in a high volatility of these deviations.
Moreover, the sign of the interest dierential is able to reect the type of capital controls,
whether outow or inow restrictions dominate. On the one hand, governments may restrict
resident purchases of foreign assets { such outwards controls, which often are designed to
prop up a weak currency, lead to a covered interest dierential favoring the foreign market.
Alternatively, governments may restrict nonresident purchases of domestic assets in order to
reduce pressures toward appreciation of the domestic currency. Such inward controls may
lead to an interest dierential favoring the domestic market.
The liberalization experiences of advanced countries in the late 1970s and 1980s are well
reected in several empirical studies on covered interest parity. An illustrative example is
the case of British controls, as documented by, e.g., Frankel (1989) and Marston (1993,
1995). Despite the fact that London already was an important nancial center, the British
government maintained a system of controls on resident outows until as late as June 1979.
The presence of controls led to large interest dierentials in the period until 1979 { moreover,
the asymmetric nature of the controls, which inhibited outward ows but not inward ows
was reected in the fact that these sizable dierentials of the British (onshore) interest rate
over the Eurosterling (oshore) rate were found to be negative. Once capital outow controls
were fully removed in 1979, covered interest parity was found to hold. Several other studies
suggest that the vast majority of countries restricted mainly outward capital ows, captured
by negative interest dierentials vis-a-vis the Eurocurrency market (see, e.g. Frankel and
MacArthur (1988), and Voth (2003)).9 Only a few countries like Germany, Switzerland, and
Japan have resorted to inward controls, where Japan's controls were aecting both inward
and outward ows (see, e.g., Marston (1995)). The Japanese government maintained a system
of capital controls throughout most of the 1970s, although the regulations varied in intensity
and eect. Until June 1974, for example, tight controls on the outow of funds led to a
Japanese (Gensaki) interest rate falling far below the Euroyen rate. Between June 1977
and January 1979, in contrast, the controls were generally binding in the opposite direction,
limiting inows of funds to Japan, leading to a positive Gensaki-Euroyen dierential. Frankel
(1989) documents that during the period of May 1979 to November 1983, the dierential fell
9In particular, Frankel and MacArthur (1988) report, for the time period of 1982-87, negative interest
dierentials for all small European countries, and for all of the LDC's in the sample, except Hong Kong.
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sharply in absolute size and turned negative again. He interprets the fact that the dierential
was actually somewhat negative during this period as evidence that the controls that remained
were working to discourage outow more than inow. In the period 1985-88, (after the
Yen/Dollar agreement of of May 1984), the dierential was essentially zero, showing evidence
of complete liberalization. This period also marks the beginning of Japan's role as a world
external creditor.
More recently, several studies study interest dierentials of emerging economies, capturing
the more recent capital control and liberalization experiences of this country group. We focus
our attention, in particular, on the group of Asian emerging economies, some of which have
become net external creditors more recently. Ma et al. (2004), Ma and McCauley (2008),
and Cheung and Qian (2010) study empirical determinants of the Chinese renminbi covered
interest dierential. They nd evidence of onshore interest rates that are substantially lower
than oshore rates in the period of 1999-2002, suggesting that outward controls dominate. In
the period after 2002, however, onshore interest rates are found much higher than oshore;
the authors attribute this nding to a shift in China's policy away from being more restrictive
on capital outows towards more inward controls.10 Ma et al. (2004) document such pattern
not only for China, but also for India, and, somewhat less pronounced, also for Taiwan and
Indonesia, suggesting that also other Asian emerging economies liberalized outow controls
and/or tightened their inow controls.
We make use of the stylized facts just presented in that they inspire the experiments we
perform in our theoretical model: on the one hand we will analyze the eects of a reduction on
capital outows in the RoW, which can be thought of stemming mostly from the group of other
industrial countries. On the other hand, we will consider an experiment of increased diculties
in borrowing for the RoW, incorporating the experiences of some emerging economies.
This section has shown that the measurement of the existence and intensity of capital
controls is empirically very challenging, and as a result the eect of restrictions to capital
mobility on economic variables is sometimes dicult to establish. We believe that even more
10Liu and Otani (2005) divide the period 1999-2005 into 3 subperiods: 1999-2000 is characterized by Chinese
authorities' intention to discourage capital outows coinciding with the period when capital ight away from
China was great and the forward exchange rate showed a discount. 2001 constitutes a transition period moving
gradually to policy of encouraging capital outows. The third period 2002-2005 clearly shows the authorities'
desire to encourage capital outows to ward o appreciatory pressures on the renminbi.
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so we need a theory of how nancial ows relate to the presence of capital controls in a
framework of the models we use in modern macroeconomics.
3 The Model
3.1 Model Setup
The world economy consists of two countries, Home and Foreign, which are taken to be the US
and the rest of the world respectively. We will assume that all idiosyncratic risk is perfectly
insured among residents of a country, i.e. within-country nancial markets are complete. We
can therefore think of a representative consumer in each country that maximizes the expected
sum of future discounted utilities from consumption, ct:
E0
1X
t=0
tu (ct) ; (1)
where  is the discount factor. The utility function u (ct) is assumed to be of the constant rel-
ative risk aversion form, u (ct) = (1= (1  ))

c1 t   1

, where  is the coecient of relative
risk aversion. The foreign representative agent faces an equivalent problem, where foreign
variables are denoted with an asterisk. Agents of each country receive an exogenous endow-
ment yt or y

t respectively in every period t. Exogenous outputs are assumed to follow a
bivariate autoregressive process of order 1:
0@ ln(yt)  ln(y)
ln(yt )  ln(y)
1A =
0@   
 
1A0@ ln(yt 1)  ln(y)
ln(yt 1)  ln(y)
1A+
0@ "t
"t
1A ; (2)
where y is mean income,  and  are coecients describing the autocorrelation and spillover
properties of the process, and "t and "

t are normally distributed mean-zero shocks with
variance  and correlation .
Asset markets are incomplete in the sense that countries are only allowed to trade in a
one-period risk-free bond, bt, which promises one unit of consumption the next period and
trades at price 1rt , where rt is the gross real interest rate. We can then write the home
country's budget constraint, given b0, as:
12
bt+1
rt
= bt + yt   ct: (3)
Even though agents are assumed to be able to trade a risk-free bond in order to smooth
their consumption, they cannot do so unrestrictedly. In particular, we assume that the home
country's debt level cannot exceed some fraction B of the level of its steady state output:11
bt+1
y
  B (4)
Due to capital outow controls international asset holdings are also limited by an upper
bound.
bt+1
y
 B (5)
The foreign country's budget constraint and the borrowing and lending constraints are
equivalent versions of equations (3), (4) and (5), replacing all variables with starred ones.
The borrowing limit for the foreign country is therefore given by
bt+1
y   B and the lending
limit is given by
bt+1
y  B

.
Due to symmetry and the fact that bond holdings must be in zero net supply, only two
of the four constraints on borrowing and lending eectively matter. More precisely, the limit
that is imposed on up to how much one country can borrow is determined by either its own
borrowing constraint or by the other country's lending constraint { whichever of the two is
stricter. Formally, the range over which the international bond can eectively be traded is
given by the interval [B;B], where B = max

 By; By

denotes the home country's
eective borrowing constraint. Similarly, B = min
 
By;By

denotes the foreign country's
eective borrowing constraint.
The equilibrium of this economy is dened as a path of interest rates frtg1t=0 together
11In principle, there is also a 'natural debt' limit as in Aiyagari (1994) according to which both countries will
not borrow more than the minimum value that the endowment can take at period t+1 discounted to period t
prices. To compute the natural debt limit in a two country model, where the interest rate is endogenous, is
more dicult than in a partial equilibrium model where the interest rate is exogenous. In addition if one of
the constraint binds for one of the economies the interest rate generally diers for each agent (for a detailed
discussion see Anagnostopoulos (2006)). However, the debt limits we impose here are generally stricter than
the natural debt limit.
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with consumption plans fctg1t=0 and fct g1t=0 and debt plans fbtg1t=0 and fbt g1t=0 such that:
1. ct and bt+1 maximize (1) subject to (3)-(4)-(5), for all t, and b0 given,
2. ct and bt+1 maximize the foreign version of (1) s.t. the foreign versions of (3)-(4)-(5),
for all t, and b0 given,
3. the real interest rate clears the bond market, bt + b

t = 0, for all t,
4. the goods market also clears (due to Walras' Law), ct + c

t = yt + y

t , for all t.
The equilibrium conditions can then be summarized as:12
uc;t   rtBt + rtBt = rtEt [uc;t+1] (6)
uc;t   rtB

t + rt
B

t = rtEt [uc;t+1] (7)
bt+1
rt
= bt + yt   ct (8)
 bt+1
rt
=  bt + yt   ct (9)

B
t [bt+1 +By] = 0 (10)
Bt

By   bt+1

= 0 (11)

B
t [ bt+1 +By] = 0 (12)
B

t
h
B

y + bt+1
i
= 0 (13)
12Where we have used the bond market clearing condition to substitute out bt .
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Equation (6) is the combination of the rst order conditions for ct and bt+1 and states
that the marginal benet from using debt to increase consumption at time t must be greater
than or equal to the expected marginal loss at time t + 1 arising from the additional debt.
Equation (8) is the Home country's budget constraint, stating that current consumption and
outstanding debt have to be nanced either from current output or by issuing new debt.
Equations (10) and (11) are the complementary slackness condition with 
B
t and 
B
t being
the multipliers on the inequality constraints (4) and (5). Finally, equations (7), (9), (10) and
(11) are the foreign equivalents to the equations just discussed.
We can distinguish ve cases that are summarized by equilibrium conditions (6)-(13):
1. The case where no borrowing or lending constraint is binding for either country. In this
case the Lagrange multipliers associated to the borrowing and lending limits are equal
to zero, i.e. 
B
t = 
B
t = 0 and 
B
t = 
B

t = 0, and the Euler equations (6)-(7) reduce
to their standard expressions.
2. The borrowing constraint binds for the home country, i.e. bt+1y =  B. The Lagrange
multiplier of the home borrowing constraint, 
B
t , which reects the shadow value of
relaxing the constraint marginally, is therefore positive.
3. The lending constraint binds for the home country, that is bt+1y = B, and 
B
t > 0:
4. The borrowing constraint binds for the foreign country, bt+1y = B

and Bt > 0.
5. The lending constraint binds for the foreign economy, bt+1y =  B

,and B

t > 0:
3.2 The Interpretation of Financial Openness and Capital Liberalization
in the Model
The framework of the model allows us to think of nancial market openness as being reected
in the tightness of the respective borrowing and lending constraints the countries are facing.
Therefore, a relaxation of a country's lending or borrowing constraints can be interpreted as
a reduction of capital controls on that country's capital outows or inows. Before we discuss
the parameter choices of these constraints in our model, let us rst consider two special cases
that are nested in our model setup and correspond to the more standard cases analyzed
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previously in the literature, known as the 'nancial autarky' case and as the incomplete
markets 'bond economy' case.
First, if B = B

= B = B = 0 then the world is in nancial autarky. In this case there is
no international consumption risk sharing { the bond cannot be used at all to insure against
idiosyncratic, country-specic risk.
Second, in the case when B, B

, B and B are suciently high, such that the constraints
would hardly ever bind, the bond can be very freely traded across countries. This case
coincides with the standard case of what is known as the incomplete markets `bond economy'
case. It is well known that under this case, even though markets are incomplete, the outcome
is very close to the perfect risk sharing case under complete markets, where consumption in
both economies perfectly co-moves (see, e.g., Baxter and Crucini (1995)).
We interpret intermediate cases between nancial autarky and no limits in borrowing
and lending as reecting intermediate stages of capital account openness, with the state of
liberalization being more advanced as B and B

, and B and B increase. The presence of
limits in bond holdings in these intermediate cases makes it hard for the countries' economic
agents to perfectly insure against country specic shocks. Since agents dislike the possibility
of being left without any consumption at any point in time, they have an incentive to build
up a buer stock of savings to facilitate consumption smoothing, that is, they have precau-
tionary savings motives. This will be the crucial mechanism with which the model is able to
generate external imbalances. As long as borrowing constraints are not 'too' relaxed, such
that consumption smoothing is not too close to perfect risk sharing, precautionary savings
motives have a signicant impact on the equilibrium bond holding policy functions.
We use our model to study a 'before' and an 'after' capital liberalization scenario. The
initial borrowing constraints, denoted BBL and BBL (BL stands for 'before liberalization' )
for the home and foreign country, and capital outow limits, B
BL
and B
BL
, are initially set
to some constant fraction of bond holding to the countries' steady state output, i.e. B = by and
B = b

y and similarly for the capital outow limit, B =
b
y and B

= b

y . From the evidence
given in section 2 it is safe to assume that the US' constraints have always been looser than
the RoW's constraints. Eectively, this means that the RoW's constraints determine how
easily both countries can access international nancial markets and make use of the bond for
their consumption smoothing purposes.
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We can use the model to perform two experiments of the eects of capital liberalization. In
the rst experiment, the catching up of the rest of the world's nancial openness in the RoW
is modeled as a one-time permanent relaxation of the upper limit of capital outows of the
foreign economy. As indicated, this reects the dismantling of restrictions on controls on cap-
ital outows especially in industrial countries, but to some degree also in emerging economies.
We model the RoW's reduction of controls on capital outows as a relaxation of the lending
constraint to a new level B
AL
(AL stands for 'after liberalization' ), with B
AL
> B
BL
.
The left column of gure 3 provides a graphical representation of this model experiment.
The upper left panel describes the initial level of openness to international nancial markets,
before liberalization. It can be seen that the US constraints ('Home constraints') are looser
than the RoW's constraints ('Foreign constraints'), and as a result the permissible region
over which the internationally traded bond can be used is pinned down by the latter, and
is given by what we call 'eective constraints'. Liberalization relaxes the RoW's constraint
on capital outows and, as a result, also implies an outward shift of the eective constraint,
B = max

 By; By

. After liberalization, the permissable region over which the bond
can be held has become larger, international nancial markets have become more accessible.
As a result both countries are now better able to use the internationally traded bond for their
consumption smoothing purposes and are able to achieve, for any given output volatility, a
lower consumption volatility. This reduces the incentives for precautionary savings in both
countries. However, because the reduction in the RoW's controls on capital outows has
led to a relaxation of the eective US borrowing constraint, and countries care more about
smoothing out the downside risk of consumption uncertainty, the US' precautionary savings
motives will fall by more than the precautionary savings motives in the RoW.
In a second experiment, we capture the limitations that some emerging market countries
faced in their ability to borrow internationally in response to nancial turbulence and crisis
experiences by modeling it as a tightening in the RoW's borrowing constraint. The nature of
what produces the shift in our second experiment is somewhat dierent than before. While,
in the previous experiment, the relaxation of the RoW's outow constraint stems from the
removal of actual regulatory restrictions on capital movements, the model experiment of the
tightening of the RoW's borrowing constraint is understood not so much as the result of actual
policies of imposing new restrictions on capital inows, but rather as an endogenous market
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Figure 3: Changes in capital controls and permissible region of bond holding
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reaction that is not explicitly modeled here. Modeling the causes of this dierential access
to international capital markets of emerging economies would be an interesting extension,
which is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we focus our analysis on the
consequences for countries' external positions. Our experiment is summarized graphically in
the right column of gure 3. Such a shift decreases the permissible region over which the
bond can be held in response to shocks to income. While this implies that the precautionary
savings motives of both countries are going to increase, it is important to emphasize that the
precautionary savings motives of the US increase by less than those of the RoW, such that
the precautionary savings motive of the US relative to the RoW actually goes down.
In our experiments we make two simplifying assumptions. One, rather than modeling
the process of liberalization as something that took place gradually over time, we make the
simplifying assumption that it occurs at once. And two, the modeling of nancial markets,
that is, the assumption that there only exists one internationally traded bond, is clearly overly
simplistic. In particular, it only allows us to analyze the eects of nancial globalization on
countries net external positions, but cannot address questions of portfolio choice or give any
rationale to why gross asset and liability positions have risen drastically. Despite the simple
setup of the model, we believe that the experiments of our model framework can provide
useful insights into the eects of capital control on the international macroeconomy.
3.3 Parameterization and Model Solution
Table 1 presents our baseline parameter values for the experiments of our model economy,
chosen such as to match US quarterly data. For simplicity, and to isolate the eects of
dierences in nancial openness, we consider a symmetric specication for all parameters
other than the capital control parameters. This way, the predictions of our model can be
understood as stemming entirely from changes in countries degree of nancial openness.
Most parameter choices are relatively standard in the literature, which we briey outline
rst. We then discuss the choice of the borrowing and lending constraints, for which there
is no previous (nor obvious) choice. The discount factor  is set to 0:9895, such as to match
an annualized interest rate of about 4% in the non-stochastic steady state. The coecient of
risk aversion  is set to 2, a common choice in macroeconomics. To obtain the parameters of
the exogenous process, we estimate a simple AR(1) on detrended US real GDP data, covering
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Table 1: Baseline parameter values
coecient of relative risk aversion  2
discount factor  0.9895
steady state level of output y, y 1
persistence of exogenous process  0.99
spillover of exogenous process  0
standard deviation of exogenous shock " 0.01
the period from 1947:Q1 to 2009:Q1. The estimates result, approximately, in a coecient of
autocorrelation  of 0:99 and a standard deviation of " = 0:01. We abstract from spillovers
or cross-country correlation of the shocks, which, however, do not turn out to be crucial for
our results.
The parameter choice for the level of the constraints on capital in- and outows is more
challenging. Unfortunately, there is no empirical counterpart that tells us what exactly the
choice of these constraints should be. We do not know how to relate regulatory measures
such as the de jure indices presented in section 2 to the quantitative measures we have in
our model, where constraints are expressed as a fraction of NFA to a country's output. On
the other hand, neither can we use actual observed capital ows as a guideline in setting the
parameter of our constraints, as we would like to explain actual ows as resulting from changes
in the constraints. We approach these diculties by starting with some initial parameters for
the constraints, but then performing extensive sensitivity analysis on a) the level of initial
constraints and b) the size of the relaxation of the constraints.
We set the initial ('before liberalization') constraints for the home economy to 100 percent
of its steady state output (BBL = B
BL
= 1), reecting the fact that the US economy was
very little constrained already in the 1980s. The initial constraints for the RoW are set such
that the RoW is initially much less nancially open that the US. We set the constraint on
both inows and outows to 50 percent of output initially (BBL = BBL = 0:5).13
Finally, we want to comment briey on the model solution. To address the questions we are
interested in, local approximation techniques like log-linearization around the non-stochastic
13As argued in section 2, the initial constraint on capital outows is likely to have been stricter, as many
economies did not restrict capital from owing into the economy as much as they prevented it from owing out
of their economies. We could have incorporated this by parameterizing the initial constraints as BBL > B
BL
.
To clearly lay out the mechanism of how the presence of international liquidity constraints aect the model
variables, we instead focus on a setup of initially equal controls on capital inows and outows.
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steady state cannot be used. Instead, we need to use a global solution technique that can
explicitly account for the inuence of second moments and occasionally binding inequality
constraints on agent's policy functions. Further details about the solution technique are
provided in the appendix.
4 Results of the Baseline Model
This section outlines our main results. Before discussing the capital liberalization experiments
we comment on the general eect of borrowing constraints in a stochastic environment. As
discussed previously, the presence of borrowing constraints give the agents of both countries
an incentive to engage in precautionary saving, to store away some extra assets in the 'good'
states of nature for the 'bad' states in which the constraint may bind and in which they may
not be able to borrow as much as they would desire in world markets. In our endowment
economy the only asset available to be used as a buer is the bond. Therefore, at most
one of the two countries can have a positive position at any point in time. Because initial
constraints are such that both countries can borrow and lend up to the same amount (and
the parameterization is symmetric otherwise), it turns out that, on average, none of the
two countries has positive holdings of the international bond initially. As rst observed by
Aiyagari (1994), as a result of these motives to hold precautionary buer assets, when the
(gross) real interest rate would be at their certainty equivalent level, 1 , there would be an
excess demand for savings. Under uncertainty, therefore, the asset price needs to be higher
relative to its non-stochastic level to clear the bond market, or, equivalently, the real interest
rate needs to be lower than in a non-stochastic world.
We now turn to our experiments of how the process of capital liberalization aects the
economic variables of our model, and in particular, how it aects the US net foreign asset
position. The rst experiment of the catching up of the RoW in terms of its nancial openness,
that is, the dismantling of controls on its capital outows is modeled as a one-time permanent
relaxation of B
BL
from 0.5 to B
AL
= 1. Because the US are initially more nancially
open (such that B
BL
< BBL), the relaxation of the RoW's constraint on capital outows
translates also into a relaxation of the US' eective borrowing constraint from 50% of its
current output level to 100% of its output. This means that before capital liberalization the
eective borrowing constraints are BBL = BBL = 0:5, but are equal to BAL = 0:5 and
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BAL = 1:0 after liberalization. We choose the mid 1980 as the date for the experiment which
coincides with the start of the decline in the US net foreign asset position and the start of a
major liberalization period.
The left column of gure 4 shows the expected paths of main macroeconomic variables in
the face of the US' increased ability to borrow in international markets in comparison to RoW.
In principle the responses shown in the gure need to be derived from averages over a large
number of simulations, such that the stochastic behavior of the economy can be 'aggregated
away' and only the deterministic change in the policy functions { that reects the change in
the importance of precautionary savings { is left over. To save computational time and to
isolate the expected paths of the model's variables we instead feed " = 0 in the `simulation'
(the policy functions themselves have, of course, been obtained from a stochastic setting with
" as indicated in section 3.3).
With the relaxation of the US' eective borrowing constraint the probability that the
constraint binds at any moment in time decreases. Both regions are now able to better
smooth consumption in response to shocks and to achieve a lower consumption volatility, and
as a result, the motives to hold precautionary assets in both countries decreases. The drop in
the US consumption demand for precautionary assets is larger, however, since home agents
can now better insure against times when their consumption is rather low.14 Accordingly,
the US motive to hold precautionary assets decreases by more than the RoW's motive for
buer assets. As a result we observe (in the rst two panels on the left column of gure 4) a
US current account decit and a gradual decline in the US net foreign asset position as the
economy transitions to a new steady state. At the end of 2007, our experiment implies US net
foreign liabilities as a ratio of output of 3.1%, which means that our proposed channel could
explain roughly one fth of the empirically observed US external position. The decrease in
the importance of US' precautionary savings also lowers its demand for the asset and, as a
consequence, pushes up the interest rate (panel 4 of gure 4) which gives the RoW a motive
to forgo consumption today. As interest rates increase the RoW nds it optimal to save and
enjoy higher consumption only in the future. The consumption responses in panel 3 of gure
4 show that home consumers implicitly become relatively more impatient. The drop in the
14That is, with concave utility, marginal utility of consumption is higher for low levels of consumption. There-
fore agents benet more from being able to smooth consumption through borrowing when their consumption
is low than from lending when their consumption is high.
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Figure 4: Response to a) a relaxation in the RoW's constraint on capital outows,
and b) to a tightening in the RoW's borrowing constraint
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precautionary savings motive leads them to consume more relative early on at the expense of
consumption in future periods, such that the long run value of US consumption at the new
steady state is at a lower level permanently.
The right column of gure 4 shows the evolution of the model's variables in response to
the second experiment we perform, a tightening of the RoW's constraint on capital inows.
As outlined before, this can be thought of as modeling the fact that many emerging countries
in practice continue to have limitations in the ability of obtaining external nance, and, after
the recurrent crises that some of the emerging markets have faced during the end of the 1990s,
have suered limitations in their ability to borrow internationally. We assume that the RoW's
borrowing constraint shifts from an initial value of BBL = 0:5 to BAL = 0:25. We observe
that the responses of the current account, the net foreign asset position and consumption
resemble, at least qualitatively, the case of the rst experiment. This again is due to a shift in
the relative importance of precautionary assets across countries: in particular, it results in a
higher precautionary savings motive in the RoW relative to the US. The crucial dierence is,
however, that the tightening in the RoW's eective borrowing constraint has led to a lower
ability to use the bond for consumption smoothing, which increases demand for precautionary
assets. As precautionary asset demand increase relatively more in the RoW, we observe net
ows from the RoW to the US. The higher worldwide asset demand also decreases the interest
rate.
It is important to note that gure 4 does not plot the responses to a particular shock,
nor did we assume that the mean or variance of the endowment processes has changed at any
point in time. The response in gure 4 is entirely due to the decrease in the importance of the
precautionary savings motive for the US economy as coming from the shift in international
liquidity constraints, and plots the expected path as the economy transitions to the new
implied steady state.
4.1 Sensitivity Analysis with respect to Capital Control Parameters
Figure 5 presents some sensitivity analysis. Given the diculty to parameterize the borrowing
limits, we consider it especially important to perform sensitivity analysis on dierent values
of the eective borrowing constraints. For displaying the results of our sensitivity analysis we
focus throughout on eective constraints, B and B. The quantitative response of net foreign
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assets to a relaxation depends on two things: one, on the degree to which the constraints where
initially restricting asset trade, and two, on the amount by which the eective constraints
are relaxed. The panels in the rst and second columns therefore show variations in the
assumptions on these constraints, either before or after capital liberalization.
We plot the rst set of sensitivity experiments with respect to the borrowing constraints in
the left column of gure 5, showing the eect of varying the degree of 'initial nancial market
openness'. We keep the size of the relaxation of the home eective borrowing constraint
constant at 0.5 (that is, BAL BBL = 0:5), and show the responses of the economic variables
for three dierent initial parameterizations. The rst set of responses repeat the baseline
case, the second assumes that initially international nancial markets were very closed (the
constraints change from BBL = BBL = 0:01 to BAL = 0:01 and BAL = 0:5), and the
third starts out in a situation where international nancial markets were relatively open to
begin with (from BBL = BBL = 1:0 to BAL = 1:0 and BAL = 1:5). Since precautionary
motives are highest when nancial markets can hardly be accessed as a means to engage in
consumption smoothing, the drop in the net foreign asset position is strongest in the case
where international nancial markets are initially very closed. In this case the implied NFA
response at the end of 2007 is -5.0% in comparison to -3.1% in the baseline case, while it is
only -2.0% in the case of initially rather open international nancial markets.
The right column of gure 5 shows dierent cases for 'the extent of liberalization', that
is, for dierent assumptions on by how much the eective borrowing constraint is relaxed.
We show the baseline case, and the changes in the constraints from BBL = BBL = 0:5 to
BAL = 0:5 and BAL = 1:5, and from BBL = BBL = 0:5 to BAL = 0:5 and BAL = 2. Not
surprisingly, the decline in the net foreign asset position is more pronounced the higher the
extent of the relaxation, in which US net foreign assets in year 2007 stand at -5.1% (in case
2) or -6.5% (in case 3) respectively.
4.2 Further Sensitivity Analysis
We also conduct sensitivity analysis of our results with respect to a number of other parame-
ters or modeling assumptions. For sake of space, we report only the implied 2007 NFA position
of the US which we focus on as the most important quantitative measure of sensitivity for
the results. Table 2 summarizes our ndings.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis for responses to a relaxation in the US eective
borrowing constraint
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Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis, US NFA at year-end 2007 (as a percentage of
GDP)
 = 1  = 2 (baseline)  = 5
-3.1 -3.1 -2.9
 = 0:95  = 0:99 (baseline)  = 0:999
-3.0 -3.1 -3.0
" = 0:0075 e = 0:01 (baseline) " = 0:02
-2.5 -3.1 -4.3
quadratic utility CRRA utility (baseline)
-3.0 -3.1
Great Moderation Capital Liberalization (baseline)
-0.8 -3.1
The parameter choices of the coecient of relative risk aversion and the persistence of the
exogenous process were found not to be crucial for the quantitative results of our experiment,
aecting the outcome only little. The size of the disturbance of the exogenous shock, on
the other hand, seem more important for the quantitative model predictions. Changing the
standard deviation of the shock of the output processes to e = 0:02, produces an imbalance
in 2007 of  4:3%. On the other hand, with e = 0:0075, the implied imbalance would be
considerably smaller at only  2:5%.
Carroll and Kimball (2006) distinguish between incentives for buer asset holdings that
derive from uncertainty and those that derive from liquidity constraints { both of which have
similar eects because they lead to a concave consumption function. Since our paper concen-
trates on the eects of buer asset holdings that derive from (changes in) liquidity constraints,
we consider the use of quadratic instead of CRRA utility, which isolates the role of precau-
tionary savings motives from the presence of international liquidity constraints by eliminating
any inherent precautionary savings motive coming from the preference-implied curvature of
marginal utility. This way, by nding that our results are insensitive to this functional form
of preferences, we are able to verify that the channel featuring most prominently in our model
is indeed the eect of international liquidity constraints as a source for precautionary asset
holdings.
Finally, in order to compare the results obtained with our approach with the recent con-
tribution of Fogli and Perri (2006) we also run the experiment of the 'great moderation' in
US business cycle volatility. In their experiment they consider a decrease in the volatility of
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US aggregate productivity of one third. The nal row of Table 2 reports the results of the
'great moderation' experiment. We nd that both capital liberalization in the RoW and the
great moderation of business cycle volatility can contribute to explaining the US net foreign
asset position. At the end of 2007, the process of capital liberalization has led to a net foreign
asset position of -3.1% of output, while the great moderation can contribute to explaining
another -0.8%.
5 A Model with Production and Capital Accumulation
It can be argued that in a setup in which agents' only option to save and to smooth consump-
tion intertemporally is through the use of the international bond, the eects of changes in
the strength of precautionary savings motives across countries have an unrealistically strong
impact on the external position. We therefore now turn to a model setup, building on Backus
et al. (1992), in which the representative agents in both countries are also owners of the
economy's capital stock which is used in production. This gives the agents another asset that
can be used to smooth intertemporal consumption and to hold savings for precautionary rea-
sons. Now, the home representative agent maximizes E0
1P
t=0
tu [ct; (1  nt)] with respect to
borrowing constraint (4) and lending limit (5). As in the endowment economy, international
asset markets can therefore be used only incompletely for consumption smoothing purposes.
The budget constraint under this set-up and the law of motion for capital are:
ct + xt +
bt+1
rt
= !tnt + r
k
t kt + bt (14)
kt+1 = (1  )kt + xt   
2

kt+1   kt
kt
2
(15)
where kt is capital, nt is labor, and wt and r
k
t refer to the wage rate and the return of
capital respectively. To avoid a counterfactual volatile investment, xt, there are adjustment
costs to install new capital. The instantaneous utility function is given by u [ct; (1  nt)] =h
ct (1  nt)
i1 
= (1  ).
Firms produce output according to a Cobb-Douglas production function and face a country
specic productivity, yt = ztf (kt; nt) = ztk

t n
1 
t . They are assumed to be competitive such
that prot maximization leads to factors being paid their marginal products.
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Technologies are modeled as exogenous processes which follow a bivariate autoregressive
process of order 1:
0@ ln(zt)  ln(z)
ln(zt )  ln(z)
1A =
0@   
 
1A0@ ln(zt 1)  ln(z)
ln(zt 1)  ln(z)
1A+
0@ "t
"t
1A (16)
where z is a parameter reecting the mean productivity,  and  are coecients describing the
autocorrelation and spillover properties of the process, and "t and "

t are normally distributed
mean-zero shocks with variance  and correlation .
The equilibrium of this economy is dened as a path of interest rates frtg1t=0 and input
prices fwtg1t=0 and

rkt
	1
t=0
together with consumption plans fctg1t=0 and fct g1t=0, plans for
hours worked fntg1t=0 and fnt g1t=0, investment plans fxtg1t=0 and fxt g1t=0, capital accumula-
tion plans fktg1t=0 and fkt g1t=0, and debt plans fbtg1t=0 and fbt g1t=0 such that households and
rms solve their optimization problems, and goods, assets and factor markets clear.
The equilibrium conditions of the full model are given by the set of equilibrium conditions
of the endowment model, equations (6)-(13) { where the budget constraints are replaced by
their versions of equation (14) { plus the capital laws of motion, the additional Euler equations
with respect to the choice of the optimal capital stock, and the labor market equilibrium
condition, given by equations (15), (17) and (18) and their foreign equivalents:
24 c t (1  nt)(1 )
1 + kt

kt+1
kt
  1

35 = Et
8>>><>>>:
c t+1 (1  nt+1)(1 )24 (1  ) + zt+1 kt+1n  1
+ kt+1

kt+2
kt+1
  1

kt+2
kt+1
35
9>>>=>>>; (17)

ct
1  nt = (1  ) ztk

t n
 
t : (18)
5.1 Parameters Values
In the model with capital we have a number of additional parameters. Following Backus
et al. (1992), the capital share  is set equal to 0:36, and the quarterly depreciation rate,
, is set to 2:5%. In order to avoid counterfactual volatile investment, we include quadratic
capital adjustment costs and chose its parameter such that model's investment series is about
3 times as volatile as output, which corresponds to  = 30. Parameter  is chosen such as
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to insure that households devote about one third of their time to market activities. In our
choice of parameters for the exogenous technology process we follow Fogli and Perri (2006),
who estimate an AR(1) process on US quarterly data. The process is symmetrically specied,
featuring an autocorrelation coecient of  = 0:98, no technological spillovers, and a mean
zero disturbance with standard deviation,  = 0:0075 and shock correlation  = 0:4.
5.2 Responses to Capital Liberalization in the Full Model with Capital
Figure 6 presents the same kind of equilibrium responses as for our baseline experiment
in the simple model when the RoW is initially facing a high level of capital controls. We
continue to perform our experiment of relaxing the RoW's constraint on capital outows from
B
BL
= 0:5 to B
AL
= 1. After capital liberalization takes place in the RoW, the foreign
lending constraint softens which also relaxes the US' eective borrowing constraint. As in the
endowment model, we can observe that the US net foreign asset position before the onset of
capital liberalization in the rest of the world is initially zero, and then starts its subsequent
decline to reach a NFA position of -3.2% in 2007. Decomposing the current account into its
two components, saving minus investment, we see that the current account moves into decit
despite of a large decrease in investment because of an even larger drop in savings. As before,
US consumers have become relatively more impatient and prefer consuming more early on at
the expense of decreases in consumption in the future. Similarly, they also prefer more leisure
early on, therefore initially decreasing hours worked at the cost of having to work more later
on. The decrease in the US precautionary savings motive and decrease in hours worked lead
to a temporary decrease in the marginal product of capital, that is, in the rate of return to
capital. This, on impact, leads to a drop in investment and a decline in the US capital stock.
The long-run response of the capital stock is, however, dominated by the latter eect; as in
the long-run the higher amount of hours worked in the US drives up the rate of return on
capital, we actually observe a slight long-run increase in the capital stock, despite the lower
relative precautionary motives.
As gure 6 shows, the drop in the US net foreign asset position remains substantial in the
capital model, despite the fact that we could expect part of the decrease of buer stock hold-
ings that result from lower precautionary motives of the US to fall on the economy's capital
stock level. Moreover, it is interesting to note, that while the change in domestic variables
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Figure 6: Response to an relaxation of controls on capital outows in the RoW
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(investment, capital stock, consumption, hours worked) are relatively small quantitatively,
the eects on the external position are quite substantial { a model prediction that is in line
with the experience of the US economy.
6 Conclusions
Since the mid 1980's we have observed a persistent decline in the US net foreign asset position
who has become the world's main net borrower. Not only is the size and persistence of the
US NFA position puzzling, it is contrary to the conventional wisdom of neoclassical theory,
which predicts that capital would ow from rich to poor countries. Among the most notable
changes in the world between the mid 1980s and today is the rapid process of dismantling of
controls on international capital ows. In this paper we have explored the role of the process
of capital liberalization in driving the US net foreign asset position into decit. For doing
so, we used a stylized model of consumption and savings choice across countries, enriched
with borrowing and lending constraints that proxy for the presence of controls on capital in-
and outows. In an extension we also considered a model with capital accumulation, which
is essentially the two-country one model good of Backus et al. (1992), a workhorse model in
international macroeconomics.
In all cases, we have shown that part of the current US net external imbalance can be a
natural outcome of the nancial liberalization experiences of other advanced and emerging
economies in terms of their nancial openness over the last 25 years.
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A Appendix: Solution Technique
To address the questions we are interested in, local approximation techniques like log-linearization
around the non-stochastic steady state cannot be used. Instead, we need to use a global so-
lution technique that can explicitly account for the inuence of second moments and the
presence of inequality constraints on agent's policy functions. The endowment model of sec-
tion 3 as well as the model with capital accumulation of section 5 are solved by an iterative
algorithm to nd the conditional expectations of the model's equilibrium conditions. Below
we briey outline the steps of the algorithm used:
 We follow the methodology of Tauchen and Hussey (1991) to discretize the exogenous
processes. We construct a grid over the model's state variables at time t. In the
following, we denote t+1 variables with a prime, e.g. b = bt, b
0 = bt+1, and accordingly,
b00 = bt+2. For the endowment economy we therefore have, for each combination of y
and y; a one-dimensional grid in b which consists of nb grid points and ranges from
min( By;By) to max(By; By). For the capital economy we construct, for each
combination of z and z; a 3-dimensional grid in k; k; b consisting of nknknb grid
points. The range for k and k is set from .6 to 1.4 times the non-stochastic steady
state level of the capital stock. The number of gridpoints was chosen to be nb = 15
and ny = ny = 15. For the full model with capital, we used nb = nk = nk = 11 and
nz = nz = 9.
 Set counter equal to 1. We make initial guesses on the model's conditional expectations
by using the log-linear solution as starting point. In the endowment economy guesses are
made for the conditional expectations of the bond Euler equations, CEBEE (b; y; y
) 
E fuc0g and CEBEE;t (b; y; y)  E fuc0g, at each grid point (b; y; y). In the capital
economy initial guesses are similarly made for CEBEE(k; k
; b; z; z), CEBEE(k; k
; b; z; z),
as well as for the conditional expectations of the two capital Euler equations, CECEE(k; k
; b; z; z) 
Et fuc0 [(1  ) + z0fk0 +k0 ]g and CECEE(k; k; b; z; z)  Et fuc0 [(1  ) + z0fk0 +k0 ]g,
at each grid point for (k; k; b; z; z).
 Using the guesses for the conditional expectations, the endogenous variables b0; c; c; r; B; B ; B,
and B

(plus k0, k0, n0 and n0 in the capital economy) can be computed at each grid-
point, by using the set of equilibrium conditions outlined in section 3.1 (or for the capital
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economy, in section 5 respectively). Having in hand the guesses of the conditional ex-
pectations as functions of (b; y; y) (respectively, (k; k; b; z; z)), we use interpolation
methods to nd CE0BEE , CE
0
BEE (and CE
0
CEE , CE
0
CEE ), which in turn can be used
to obtain b00; c0; c0; r0; B0; B
0; B0, and B
0 (plus k00, k00, n00 and n00 in the capital
economy).
 With the found values of c0, c0 (n0, n0, k00, k00), together with the discretized states
and transition matrix for the exogenous processes, we can compute expected future
marginal utility and expected future rates of return on capital which we can use to
obtain updated guesses of the conditional expectations in the Euler Equations.
 The above steps are repeated until convergence is achieved.
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